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Layoffs, Top Executive Pay, and Firm Performance
By Kevin F. H allock *
This paper examines the connection between layoffs, executive pay, and stock
prices. Firms that announce layoffs in the previous year pay their CEOs more,
and give their CEOs larger percentage raises than firms which do not have at
least one layoff announcement in the previous year. However, the likelihood of
announcing a layoff varies dramatically along other dimensions, for example
firm size, which are also correlated with CEO pay. Once firm-specific fixed effects
are controlled for, the CEO pay premium for laying off workers disappears. In
addition, there is a small negative share price reaction to layoff announcements.
(JEL J33, G14)
The popular press and some policy groups
are increasingly reporting stories of firms with
highly paid CEOs that fire thousands of work
ers only to see large increases in the firm stock
price (and their own wealth) and their pay in
the following year.1 There are several reasons
why we might see layoffs in these firms. There
may, for example, be a declining product de
mand which also shifts labor demand for the

* Department o f Econom ics and Institute o f Labor and
Industrial R elations, U niversity o f Illin ois at UrbanaChampaign, 504 East Armory Avenue, Champaign, IL
61820. I thank John Abowd, Lanny Arvan, David Card,
Ken Chay, Larry D eB rock, Henry Farber, Shane
G reenstein, Charles H adlock, W ally H endricks, John
Kennan, R oger Koenker, Alan Krueger, Jonathan
Leonard, B entley M acL eod, Laurie M organ, K evin
Murphy, Craig Olson, Paul Oyer, Steve Pischke, Mike
Podgursky, John Karl Scholz, and the referee for comments
and/or discussions. I am particularly grateful to Mike Boozer
for numerous discussions and careful suggestions. I also
thank seminar participants at the University of CalifomiaBerkeley, the University o f Illinois, the University of Mis
souri, Princeton University, the Wharton School o f the
University o f Pennsylvania, the University o f Wisconsin, the
January 1997 meetings of the Association of Financial Econ
omists in New Orleans, and the May 1997 meeting o f the
Society of Labor Economists in Washington, DC. Sherrilyn
Billger, Rebekah Frese, and Heather Radach provided excel
lent research assistance. This project was funded under pur
chase order number B 9461993 from the office o f the
Assistant Secretary for Policy of the United States Depart
ment of Labor. Points of view or opinions stated in this doc
ument do not necessarily represent the official position or
policy o f the Department of Labor.
1
See, for example, Sarah Anderson and John Cavanagh
(1 9 9 4 ); Allan Sloan (1 9 9 6 ).
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firm.2 There is some support for this given the
significant numbers of layoffs during the eco
nomic downturn of the early 1990’s. Secondly
a firm may announce layoffs when the pro
duction process changes in a way to increase
worker productivity and reduce firm labor de
mand. This may have been occurring in recent
layoffs with the substitution of workers with
new capital (computers, for example). If it is
the case that CEOs do earn more while work
ers lose their jobs, it could be the result of a
compensating differential for a painful aspect
of CEOs’ jobs or it could be that downsizing
is simply a way to increase shareholder wealth
and that is the job of the CEO.3
The main focus of this paper is to document
whether there is empirical evidence for the no
tion that CEOs heading firms that let workers
go are relatively more likely to see increases
in their own pay in the following year for mak
ing these decisions. The work focuses on the
compensation of, on average, 550 of Amer
ica’s highest paid CEOs each year from 1989
to 1995. These data are merged with standard
firm accounting data, stock performance data,
and detailed data on layoffs back to 1987.
With these data, I also document the nature of

2 John Abowd et al. (1 9 9 0 ) describe a case o f a “ per
manent staff reduction,” which this paper explores in an
event study framework in Section III.
3 Jay Dial and Kevin J. Murphy (1 9 9 5 ) explore issues
o f downsizing and shareholder wealth in great detail at
General Dynamics.
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the news contained in layoff announcements
by looking at their impact on stock prices.
Layoff announcements could be a signal that
the firm has finally realized that it needs fixing
and the layoffs are a positive sign of reorgan
ization that will lead to a more successful firm.
On the other hand, layoffs could be a signal
that the firm is on a downward trend. I use
standard event study analysis to examine the
cumulative excess returns in event windows
around the layoff announcement dates.
Consistent with anecdotal evidence as re
ported in the business press, in the cross sec
tion, firms that announce layoffs tend to pay
their CEOs more in the years following the
layoffs and CEOs heading firms with recent
layoff announcements enjoy larger percent
age salary increases. However, after control
ling for other determinants of CEO pay across
firms, I find that layoffs have little impact on
CEO pay. That is, conditional on other factors
(both observed and unobserved), CEOs on
average do not earn more in years following
announced layoffs. Moreover, contrary to the
conventional wisdom, there is a small nega
tive stock market reaction to announced
layoffs.
The data and data sources are described in
Section I. Section II explains the basic effects of
layoff announcements on CEO pay, outlines the
empirical model of CEO pay, and describes the
layoff-CEO pay results. Section III studies the
effects of layoff announcements on the stock
market and on the CEOs’ own shareholdings,
and concluding comments are in Section IV.
I. Data
The CEO compensation data are from
Forbes Magazine’s annual CEO compensation
issues and constitute the original base sample.
For each firm for which I have measures of
CEO compensation I search for information on
returns, accounting characteristics, and layoff
data. The firms’ accounting data are collected
from Standard & Poor’s Compustat. Firm
stock market performance measures are col
lected from the Center for Research in Secu
rity Prices (C R SP) at the University of
Chicago. Finally, layoff data are collected
from the Wall Street Journal using Pro Quest’s
Newspaper Abstracts.
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A. CEOs
The first column in Table 1 reports means
(and standard errors) for various measures of
real (1995) compensation and detailed per
sonal characteristics, such as CEO’s age (av
erage of 5 7 ), years of seniority as CEO
(average of 9), and years of seniority in the
firm (average of 24), for the CEOs of 800 of
the largest firms in the United States collected
from Forbes Magazine’s annual compensation
issues. This study uses the 1990-1996 com
pensation issues which cover the seven years
from 1989 through 1995.
Forbes reports three main measures of com
pensation: salary plus bonus (mean real value
in 1995, $1.3 million), salary plus bonus plus
other (including such measures as savings
plan contributions, and the value of member
ships to clubs) ($1.7 million), and total com
pensation ($2.5 million). Total compensation
is the sum of salary, bonus, and other, but also
includes the value of stock options exercised.
Another possible measure of compensation
that is not studied here would include the value
of stock options granted to a CEO in a given
year. Data on stock options granted are diffi
cult to collect especially in the earlier years of
the study, before the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) began requiring firms to
disclose options in a standard format. In ad
dition, stock options are often granted in
bunches every few years. This makes it partic
ularly difficult to attach a given option grant
with a given year. (See, however, Brian Hall
and Jeffrey Liebman, 1998.) Clifford W.
Smith, Jr. and Jerold L. Zimmerman (1976)
also discuss that it is difficult to value (the
potentially restricted) options granted to man
agers. This paper focuses mainly on total com
pensation, although the results are very similar
if salary plus bonus or salary plus bonus plus
other are used. Using these data, the plot in
Figure 1 shows that real CEO pay has in
creased dramatically from 1989 through 1995
(over 40 percent).
B. Firms
Compustat and CRSP are the sources for the
annual firm characteristic data. Table 1 reports
summary statistics for the market value of the
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T able 1— S ample M eans ( and Standard Errors)

for

Pay

and

Other C haracteristics
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713
L ayoff Status

All
firms

N o layoffs
announced in
previous
year

At least one
layoff in
previous year

ta

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Panel A: Levels o f pay
Salary plus bonus (thousands)

1282
(27.24)

1231
(29.61)

1686
(59.73)

6.83

Salary plus bonus plus other
(thousands)

1663
(34.86)

1590
(37.18)

2241
(94.90)

6.39

Total compensation (thousands)

2501
(120.99)

2379
(86.22)

3466
(598.34)

1.80

Percentage change in salary plus
bonus6

0.09
(0.01)

0.08
(0.01)

0.23
(0.04)

4.14

Percentage change in salary plus bonus
plus other6

0.16
(0.01)

0.15
(0.01)

0.26
(0.04)

3.18

Percentage change in total
compensation6

0.41
(0.04)

0.40
(0.05)

0.46
(0.09)

0.53

A ge

57.08
(0.12)

57.07
(0.13)

57.13
(0.29)

0.21

Seniority in firm

24.02
(0.21)

24.03
(0.22)

23.96
(0.68)

0.09

Seniority as CEO

8.90
(0.14)

9.24
(0.15)

6.21
(0.27)

6.96

Market value o f equity (millions)

5289
(159.45)

4431
(133.20)

12096
(877.47)

8.64

Total number o f em ployees
(thousands)

29.55
(0.96)

24.88
(0.90)

66.53
(4.29)

9.51

Sample size

3242

2879

363

Panel B: Percentage change in pay

Panel C: CEO characteristics

Panel D: Firm size

Sources: Compensation and CEO characteristic data are from Forbes Magazine and are in real 1995 dollars. Firm
accounting data are from Standard & Poor’s Compustat and are in 1995 dollars. L ayoff data collected by author from
Wall Street Journal articles as reported by Pro Quest’s Newspaper Abstracts.
a ¿-statistic for the difference in sample means between columns (2) and (3).
b Percentage change in compensation from year t — 1 to year t.

firm (calculated as the price per share times
the total number of shares, reported in millions
of dollars) and the number of employees for

each firm (reported in thousands) from 1987
through 1995. The averages for these variables
over the sample period were $5.3 billion and
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F igure 1. Layoff A nnouncements

29,550, respectively. The average number of
employees has increased by 8.7 percent be
tween 1987 and 1995 from 28,270 to 30,730.
The average firm value has increased by
roughly 85 percent between 1987 and 1995,
and in 1995 stood at about $6.7 billion. The
stock return of the firm varies significantly.
The yearly average for this variable varied
from 1987 through 1995 from -0.12 to 0.44.
C. Layoffs
The ideal data on layoffs for the questions I
posed in the introduction would include all
layoff announcements of any size for all firms
in the sample, and include the firm name, the
date, the size, and the reason and nature (e.g.
permanent, temporary, etc.) of each layoff.
The layoff data I have assembled are collected
from Pro Quest’s Newspaper Abstracts, a CDROM data source that lists abstracts of articles
from major newspapers. Newspaper Abstracts
allows the user to search for abstracts or head
lines with particular words or word combina
tions, from particular publications, and over
specific time periods.
I searched for abstracts and headlines from
January 1, 1987 through December 31, 1995,

and CEO

Compensation

by

Y ear

in the Wall Street Journal which contained any
of the following words or word combinations:
' ‘layoff,” “ laid off,” “ downsize,” “ plant
closing,” or “ downsizing.” In these years I
discovered 3,470 abstracts in the Wall Street
Journal which contained these words. If, for a
given firm, no abstracts were found in a year,
that firm was assigned zero layoff announce
ments. Clearly many of the articles with these
words in them could not be linked with a spe
cific firm as they may have been— for example,
an article on how ‘‘laid off ’’ workers deal with
stress. Robert B. Thompson II et al. (1987) dis
cuss potential problems with using the Wall
Street Journal as it may not be true that all firms
in the sample announce all events (or that the
Journal chooses to report all events) with equal
frequency or timeliness. However, most event
studies have relied on the Wall Street Journal
to identify events and this work assumes that
all layoff announcements for these firms are re
ported in the Wall Street Journal There are at
least two reasons why this is a reasonable as
sumption. First, the base sample (the compen
sation data) is essentially the largest firms in
the United States. Therefore, if something hap
pens in these firms, it is probably reported in
the Wall Street Journal Secondly, layoffs of
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unusually small numbers of employees are re
ported in some instances providing evidence
that even small news events in these large firms
get reported and appear in my data. An alter
native measure of downsizing might be fluc
tuations in the number of employees reported
by firm by year in Compustat. This measure is
not likely to be superior to the measure used
here since there is some evidence that Com
pustat employment numbers are error prone as
they are not subject to auditing as many Com
pustat financial data are.4
The union of the data sets yields a panel of
3,242 valid firm-year observations. The distri
bution of the number of layoff announcements
per 1,000 firms is displayed by year in Figure 1
(along with the time-series plot of average
CEO pay discussed above).5 It is clear from
the figure that there were substantially more
layoffs announced in each year in the 1990’s
than in the late 1980’s.6 Although the layoff
numbers in Figure 1 are rates per 1,000 firms
in my sample, the general trend in layoffs is
consistent with the results of Henry S. Farber
(1993, 1996), who explores layoffs for a
much more general group of firms.
I also collected data on the reasons for lay
off announcements for the 1,287 announced
layoffs in my sample. A large proportion of
the firms reported either a slump in demand in
the economy (21.5 percent), restructuring or
reorganization (15.7 percent), or cost control
(18.3 percent) as reasons for layoffs. A rela
tively large fraction (20.4 percent) did not re

4 In the Compustat data for the firms in my sample, for
example, there are many instances where a firm in con
secutive years reports precisely the same number o f em 
ployees (for example, R. R. Donnelley & Sons, Warner
Lambert, and Seagate T echnology). Furthermore, U ni
versal reported exactly 25,000 em ployees in 1992, 1993,
and 1994. Berkshire Hathaway reported exactly 22,000
em ployees in those three consecutive years.
5 Throughout the paper, year means fiscal year for that
company. For many firms, the fiscal and calendar years
are the same. In the regressions which follow I control for
year effects using indicators which represent the calendar
year in which most o f the fiscal year falls. If, instead, I
use the actual fiscal years to control for year effects, I get
virtually identical results.
6 The simple correlation between the annual unemploy
ment rate and the annual number o f announced layoffs
announced in the Wall Street Journal is 0.67.

715

port a reason for the layoff. Most firms (86.3
percent) never make layoff announcements in
a given year. However, of the firms that make
at least one layoff announcement, 67 percent
make only one in a given year.
II. Layoff Announcements and CEO Pay

A. Basic Facts
The goal of this section is to study the sim
ple connection between announced layoffs
and CEO pay, beginning with columns (2)
and (3) of Table 1. Column (2) presents
mean characteristics for firms that made no
layoff announcements in the previous year.
Column (3) presents mean characteristics for
firms that made at least one layoff announce
ment in the previous year. Panel A of Table
1 is evidence for the view that firms that an
nounce layoffs have CEOs who earn rela
tively large sums in the year following the
layoff. For each of the three measures of com
pensation, CEOs who head firms that had at
least one announced layoff in the previous
year earn between 37- and 46-percent (de
pending on which measure of compensation
is used) higher average pay than CEOs with
no such announcements.
The next panel of Table 1 documents that
even when looking at percentage changes in
pay from the previous year to the current year,
CEOs whose firms announced layoffs in the
previous year enjoyed higher raises relative to
CEOs of firms that did not, although this dif
ference is only significant for the first two
measures of pay. It is also the case that the
medians (not reported here) of each of these
variables are smaller for the “ no layoff in the
previous year’’ group relative to the group that
announced at least one layoff in all cases.
Of course, simply because these firms an
nounce layoffs and have higher CEO pay does
not mean that these layoffs cause the higher
pay. Perhaps, for example, larger firms tend to
lay off workers more frequently and have
higher CEO pay. It is well documented that
larger firms pay their CEOs more [see, for ex
ample, Kevin J. Murphy (1985) and Michael
C. Jensen and Murphy (1990)]. The question
here is: are large firms more likely to lay off
workers? If workers were laid off randomly
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market value of equity decile

- m - layoff fraction —
F igure 2. F raction

of

CEO compensation

F irms A nnouncing at L east O ne L ayoff and M edian Total CEO Compensation
M arket V alue of Equity D ecile

and if larger firms have more employees,7then
we might expect larger firms to be more likely
to announce layoffs. Panel D of Table 1 shows
that the average size of the firms with layoff
announcements is much larger than firms that
do not make layoff announcements. As further
evidence of this point, in Figure 2 I plot the
fraction of firms announcing at least one layoff
within each of the 10 firm stock market value
(which is my measure of firm size) deciles.
Between 1987 and 1995, 4.6 percent of the
smallest 10 percent of firms (measured in
terms of stock market value) announced lay
offs, whereas 34 percent of the largest 10 per
cent of firms did over the sample period. It is
clear from the figure that the largest firms are,
on average, much more likely to announce lay

by

offs (note, however, there is not a significant
difference between deciles 1 and 6, for ex
ample). Figure 2 also plots the median total
compensation over the sample period.8 The
similarity in the shapes of the two lines is strik
ing. This suggests that the simple relationship
found in the cross section between layoff
events and CEO pay is not a causal one. While
Figure 2 indicates that controlling for at least
firm size is clearly necessary to more closely
examine the link between layoffs and CEO
pay, we need to be aware that other features
of firms, both observed and unobserved, may
be simultaneously influencing both variables.
B. Empirical Model o f CEO Pay
and Results
Figure 2 indicates the need to account for
the multiplicity of factors that influence CEO

7
Certainly one measure o f firm size can be the total
number o f em ployees in which case the statement in the
text would be true by definition. Typically, other measures
such as stock market value o f the firm, profits, or total
assets are used to measure firm size. H owever, these mea
sures are all correlated with one another and with total
number o f em ployees. The simple correlation between to
tal number o f em ployees and stock market value o f the
firm in this sample is 0.49.

8
A plot of the average number o f em ployees versus the
sam e ten-firm market value d eciles yield s a sim ilarly
shaped figure. In addition, plots o f the other two measures
o f compensation against market value deciles have a sim 
ilar upward trend with increasing average levels o f pay at
the highest firm market value deciles.
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pay while simultaneously affecting the pro
pensity for layoffs by firms. The following
regression model will be used as a basis to
further explore the relationship between lay
offs and CEO pay in a multivariate context:
(1)

Table 2— B asic R egression R esults: E ffects
Layoff on CEO Pay

0)

(2)

(3)

0.378*
(0.048)

0.134*
(0.044)

—0.050
(0.036)

Log(market value
o f equity)

—

0.319*
(0.012)

0.534*
(0.033)

(Annual return),-,

___

0.149*
(0.034)

0.070*
(0.026)

Other regressors5

no

yes

yes

781 firm indicators

no

no

yes

0.019

0.252

0.693

(Any layoff),.,

+ Lit- A + 0Li + eit,

9 There are several possible alternative specifications.
One could use instead o f layoff announcements, changes
in the total number em ployed in the firm (from Compustat ). This is clouded, however, by other changes in the
firm as w ell as by other hires. Another technique would
study the fraction o f the workforce laid off. This idea is
discussed below.
10 In the analysis reported in Table 2, I control for
“ year” effects. There is a problem in doing this if som e
firms have different fiscal years. For the purpose o f cre
ating time indicator variables, I have assigned years equal
to the fiscal year if the fiscal year end is after June 1, and
the previous year otherwise (effectively assigns the year
where most o f the fiscal year occurred). If I use actual
fiscal years as time indicators, I get virtually identical
results.

of

Dependent variable: Log
compensation3

Cit = xltfi + Fity + Rit _ j<5

where C = Log CEO compensation, x = CEO
characteristics (such as age and seniority), F =
firm characteristics (such as market value of
equity), R = market return, L = a binary in
dicator for a layoff announcement,9 and (a, +
eit) is the composite error term containing pos
sible permanent effects. The subscripts i and t
represent firms and time in fiscal years, re
spectively.10 This specification is relatively
standard in the literature on CEO compensa
tion (e.g. Murphy, 1985). The timing of the
independent variable on layoff reflects the fact
that boards set CEO pay for year
at the
end of year “t - 1.” We expect, therefore,
that if a CEO is rewarded for a layoff last year,
then such a reward would be made this year.
I first estimate equation (1) (via OLS) with
out including any covariates other than the in
dicator for layoff last year. The results of this
bivariate regression appear in column (1) of
Table 2. The coefficient on the layoff indicator
is 0.378 (translating into a percentage gain of
roughly 46 percent), and highly statistically
significant (the ¿-statistic is in excess of 7).
This is a large effect, taken at face value, and
suggests that the premium for CEOs making
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R2

3 Compensation is the sum o f salary, bonus, other com 
pensation, and exercised options collected from various
issues o f Forbes M agazine’s annual compensation survey.
b Other regressors are age o f the CEO and its square,
seniority o f the CEO in the firm and its square, seniority
of the CEO as CEO and its square, and yearly indicator
variables.
* Significantly different from 0 at the 1-percent level.
Sam ple size is 3,242. Standard errors are in
parentheses.

layoffs is quite large. This result, however, ig
nores the message of Figure 2, and suggests
examining the layoff effect holding constant
other factors. In column (2) of Table 2, I es
timate the relationship between lagged layoff
and CEO pay as specified in equation (1)
(again via OLS) while controlling for age of
the CEO and its square, seniority of the CEO
in the firm and its square, seniority of the CEO
as CEO and its square, firm size [measured as
log (stock market value)],11 lagged stock re
turns, and yearly indicator variables, but ig
noring the presence of the fixed component,
cti, of the error term. The coefficient on lagged
layoff declines substantially to 0.134 but is
still positive and quite statistically significant.
Thus the result of this specification still

11
Log (stock market value) is more appropriate than
the levels specification in this case. See Hallock (1 9 9 7 )
for details.
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suggests that there are possibly significant per
sonal financial gains to be made for a CEO
making a layoff announcement, on the order
of 14 percent. Holding constant these addi
tional factors reduce the bivariate effect
substantially.
Clearly, however, firm size as well as CEO
characteristics do not fully explain the link be
tween previous period layoffs and CEO pay
(the R 2 is roughly 0.25), and we need to allow
for the possibility that other characteristics of
firms and CEOs which have not been included
here are confounding our investigation of the
relationship between these variables.
To potentially remedy this situation, I make
use of the benefits of the panel data I have
collected. If one is willing to assume the
source of endogeneity arises only through the
permanent component of the error term, , 12
and not through the transitory component, eit,
then the standard fixed-effects estimation of
(1) will yield consistent estimates of the pa
rameters. These results are presented in col
umn (3) of Table 2. Notice that now, the
coefficient on the lagged layoff announcement
indicator variable is slightly negative, but not
significant. Once the firm fixed effects are con
trolled for, the apparent positive premium as
sociated with layoff announcements for CEO
pay disappears. The chi-squared value of the
Hausman test of the fixed-effects versus the
random-effects specification of equation (1) is
highly significant (p -value < 0.001), and in
dicates that inferences based on the final spec
ification [column (3)] are most appropriate.
Thus the evidence in Table 2 shows that there
is no evidence in these data of a positive pre
mium in CEO pay arising from a layoff an
nouncement. Conditional on being associated
with a given firm, a CEO making a layoff an
nouncement will not, on average, experience
a pay increase the following year.
I also examine these same effects, but allow
ing for the possibility that different types of
layoffs have different effects on CEO pay. It
is reasonable to hypothesize, for example, that
CEO pay responds differently to temporary

121 have taken the fixed effects as firm -specific
effects— controlling for CEO-specific fixed effects yields
qualitatively similar results.
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layoff announcements as opposed to perma
nent layoff announcements. Eighty-six percent
of layoffs in my sample were categorized as
permanent, 9 percent as temporary, with the
remainder uncategorized. If the regressions in
Table 2 are rerun on just the data for perma
nent layoffs, the same basic results emerge. If
only temporary layoffs are considered, large
negative results of layoffs on CEO pay appear,
but these estimates are not precisely mea
sured.13 Thus, this source of heterogeneity in
the treatment does not appear to reveal any
positive response of CEO pay to different
types of layoff announcements.
It might also be instructive to explore
whether larger layoffs have larger effects on
CEO pay.14 To this end, I created a new vari
able, the ratio of the total number of employ
ees laid off to total employment in the firm that
year. This can be included in a regression like
that described in equation (1) except that the
lagged fraction of employees laid off is an in
dependent variable rather than whether at least
one lagged layoff was made. The results of this
exercise suggest that it is not the case that, as
firms lay off a larger percentage of the total
workforce, their CEOs earn higher pay in the
following year. If this analysis is repeated on
only the firms which make some layoffs (i.e.,
excluding the zero-valued layoff fractions) the
results are universally insignificant.
III. The Effect of Layoff Announcements
on Stock Performance

A. Methodology
This section explores whether there is a
share price reaction to layoff announcements.
The aim is to test whether shareholders (and,
therefore, subsequently CEOs who own sig
nificant shares in their firms) gain because of
management’s decision to downsize as much

13 Additionally, if an indicator for temporary layoff is
included in a fixed-effects regression, the coefficient es
timate on temporary layoff is negative but insignificant.
14 The size o f the layoffs cannot be determined in 9.8
percent o f the firm years. If these firms were excluded
from the previous analysis in Table 2, the results do not
change in any meaningful way.
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of the popular press has been suggesting (see,
for example, Sloan, 1996).15
In order to explore the effects of layoff an
nouncements on stock price and the CEO’s
own wealth, I will employ standard market
model event study analysis (see Eugene Fama
et al., 1969; Richard S. Ruback and Martin
B. Zimmerman, 1984; Stephen J. Brown and
Jerold B. Warner, 1985; A. Craig MacKinlay,
1997). The cumulative average excess returns
are calculated using equally weighted return
data from the Center for Research in Security
Prices from the beginning of 1987 through the
end of 1995. The estimate of ¡3 (from running
a least-squares regression of firm returns on
market returns) is obtained from trading days
—500 to —250. The goal is to see if there are
cumulative abnormal returns over certain
event windows around layoff announcement
dates and whether such returns are positive or
negative.
B. Results
Table 3 , row 1, shows for each of several
event windows negative cumulative average
excess returns for the 1,287 total layoff an
nouncements studied in this paper. On the
event day (time = 0), the share price reaction
is, on average, —0.4 percent with a /-statistic
of 6 .7 . This table also presents cumulative av
erage excess returns for five other event win
dows; day 0 to day 5, day - 1 to day 1, day
- 5 to day 5, day - 1 0 to day 10, and day - 2 0
to day 20 (the largest event window studied
by MacKinlay, 1997). For all layoffs, the cu
mulative average excess returns vary from
—0.3 percent for event windows t — ~ 1 to 1
and t = - 5 to 5, to - 0.7 percent (days -1 0
to 10 and days -2 0 to 20) and are all signifi
cant. Figure 3 is a plot of the cumulative av
erage excess returns from day —20 to day 20.
Sudip Datta and Mai Iskandar-Datta ( 1996)

15
Abowd et al. (1 9 9 0 ) do not find a particular price
effect (in either direction) o f several human resource man
agement decision announcements on stock price. H ow 
ever, they do find that announcements o f ‘ ‘permanent staff
reductions and shutdowns or relocating” are linked with
increases in the variation o f returns in event windows near
the announcement date.
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study layoff announcements for a period inside
the sample used in this paper, 1989 to 1991,
collected from the Wall Street Journal Index.
They also find that “ contrary to financial press
assertions, layoff announcements are inter
preted by the stock market as a negative sig
nal.” They find an effect of —0.8 percent on
the day of the announcement. Richard E.
Caves and Matthew B. Krepps (1993) exam
ine layoffs of ‘‘nonproduction’’ employees for
the period that also includes the two prior
years and find average excess returns at date
zero of -0 .6 percent. If I restrict my sample
to events occurring in 1989-1991, my point
estimate of average excess returns on the event
date is —0.6 percent (¿-statistic 7.95).16 Thus,
while the excess returns effects of layoffs are
precisely measured, and visually apparent in
Figure 3, the magnitude of the effect is small
and clearly not positive. There does not, there
fore, appear to be any direct means by which
a CEO can experience a financial windfall
from a layoff announcement through his hold
ings in the firm.
The second and third rows of Table 3 ex
amine cumulative average excess returns for
permanent and temporary layoffs separately.17

16 If I restrict m y sample in this way for all event win
dows studied, the negative returns are larger in absolute
value than I report for the entire sample in Table 3. If I do
the event study analysis by year, the point estimate for
average excess returns on the event date are all negative
(except for 1987) and are no larger (in absolute value)
than 0.76 percent (1 9 9 0 ). When examining average ex 
cess returns on the event date, there does not appear to be
a particular pattern o f more (or less) positive excess re
turns as time progresses through die data set. However,
when examining larger event windows, the cumulative av
erage excess returns are significantly positive in the last
two years o f the sample.
Dan L. Worrell et al. (1 9 9 1 ) studied the effects o f lay
o ff announcements on the stock market value o f the firm
for 194 firms covering the years 1979 through 1987 and
found a significantly negative effect o f layoffs, but the
effect was isolated to the days immediately around the
event date. Nancy Ursel and Marjorie Armstrong-Stassen
(1 9 9 5 ) study 57 Canadian layoffs from 1 9 8 9 -1 9 9 2 , and
M orley Gunderson et al. (1 9 9 7 ) study 214 Canadian lay
offs from 1 9 8 2 -1 9 8 9 . Both papers find a negative share
price effect.
17 Eighty-six percent o f the layoffs were classified as
permanent and 9 percent were classified as temporary. The
remaining layoffs could not be classified as either per
manent or temporary.

720

THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
Table 3— C umulative A verage E xcess R eturns

for

SEPTEMBER 1998

V arying Event W indows

and

T ypes

of

Layoffs

Days relative to layoff announcement date

t = 0

t = 0 to 5

t — —1 to 1

t = —5 to 5

t = - 1 0 to 10

t = - 2 0 to 20

All layoffs

- 0 .0 0 4
(6.728)

- 0 .0 0 5
(4.284)

- 0 .0 0 3
(3.045)

- 0 .0 0 3
(2.247)

- 0 .0 0 7
(3.590)

- 0 .0 0 7
(3.499)

Permanent layoffs

- 0 .0 0 3
(4.714)

- 0 .0 0 5
(3.294)

- 0 .0 0 2
(1.535)

- 0 .0 0 2
(1.031)

- 0 .0 0 7
(2.905)

- 0 .0 0 7
(2.617)

Temporary layoffs

-0 .0 0 1
(0.984)

0.003
(0.611)

0.002
(0.009)

0.002
(0.018)

0.001
(0.250)

- 0 .0 1 0
(1.693)

Notes: ¿-statistics are in parentheses.
Sources: Cumulative average excess returns are calculated using equally weighted returns from Center for Research in
Security Prices from 1987 through 1995 and the standard market model. L ayoff events are from Wall Street Journal
articles as abstracted in Pro Quest’s Newspaper Abstracts from 1987 through 1995.

Since most layoffs are permanent it is not un
usual that the cumulative average excess re
turns for permanent layoffs look quite similar
to those for all layoffs.
I also explored average excess returns by
reason for the layoff (not reported in the ta
bles). Of course, the reasons stated in the Wall
Street Journal articles and the actual reasons
for the layoffs may not be exactly the same.
However, I categorized 17 reasons for layoffs
stated most often in the articles and three de
serve attention. In-house merger is the only
reason stated that has a consistent positive
share price reaction, although it is not always
statistically significant. On the day of the an
nouncement, plus the five days following,
firms announcing layoffs that were catego
rized as in-house mergers had an average ex
cess return of 5 percent with a ¿-statistic of
3.03. However, on the event date, the reaction
is positive, but the ¿-statistic is only 1.8. Inhouse merger may be one of the kinds of layoff
reasons we would expect to have a positive
share price reaction. If shareholders believe
that management is making these mergers to
make the firm more lean, then this makes
sense. Much of the discussion in the popular
press that focuses on the difficult decisions that
CEOs need to make to keep American firms
strong could be related to this category.
Bankruptcy, on the other had, has just the
opposite effect. Clearly, if the market has no
other signal that the firm is in financial trouble
in advance of a layoff for bankruptcy reasons,
then the market would be expected to react

negatively. Of all 17 reasons for layoffs, bank
ruptcy has the single largest average negative
excess return on the event date, -12.3 percent
(t - 7.8).18
Another stated reason for layoffs is closing
plant/plant transfer. For this category the
stock price drops by 0.4 percent on the day of
the announcement (¿-statistic = 1.87) and the
cumulative average excess return is —1.3 per
cent for day of the announcement plus the five
days following (t = 1.7). Other authors have
explored the link between plant closings and
share price reaction. David Blackwell et al.
(1990) examined the connection between
plant closings and financial performance for a
sample of 286 plant closing announcements
from the Wall Street Journal for an older and
shorter time period, 1980 through 1984. They
found a connection between plant closing an
nouncements and negative abnormal returns,
but that the negative abnormal returns are only
statistically significant for the cases in which
the management defined the reason for the
plant closing to be 4‘operations not profitable’’
as opposed to 4‘consolidation of facilities”
(like in-house merger, which I have stated
above shows a positive reaction), ‘‘labormanagement dispute,” or “ environmental

18
Note that while the magnitude o f the bankruptcy lay
o ff effect is large, this reason for a layoff constitutes only
an extremely small fraction o f all reasons for layoffs (less
than 0.5 percent); thus the effect o f layoffs other than
bankruptcy is essentially the same as the overall effect.
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regulations.” 19 The reason studied in this pa
per most like “ labor management dispute” is
union strike, where the reaction is also nega
tive, but not significant. Blackwell et al.
(1990) conclude that it may not be the an
nouncement that causes the negative share
price reaction, but that the announcements
may simply reflect declines in demand for the
product produced by the firm or bad invest
ments made earlier.
I also investigated whether the results of the
event study vary by industry (not reported in
the tables). For this analysis, all firms were
grouped into their two-digit industries as col
lected from Compustat. In only one case (fab
ricated metal, extraction machinery, and
transfer equipment) is there a positive abnor
mal return on the event date, but the cumula
tive average excess returns are negative (and
sometimes significant) in slightly larger event
windows. Several of the industries have rather
large negative average excess returns on the
event date, including stone, clay, glass, and

19
Michael J. Gombola and George P. Tsetsekos (1 9 9 2 )
find a strong negative stock price reaction to plant closing
announcements in ‘ ‘financially weak’ ’ firms but do not for
“ financially strong’’ ones. Rajiv Kalra et al. (1 9 9 4 ) clas
sify 132 plant closings from 1984 to 1987 as “ aggressive’’
(designed to increase cash flow s) or “ passive’’ (sym p
tomatic o f bad n ew s) and find positive share price reac
tions for the former and negative for the latter.

concrete products ( —2.0 percent), general
merchandise stores ( —1.8 percent), and busi
ness services (-4 .3 percent).
The evidence reported in Table 3 is consis
tent with the few other authors who have stud
ied the effects of layoffs on stock price, but I
use substantially more years and more firms.
Although there are qualifications, the general
finding is that, on average, and in contradiction
to the recent conventional wisdom, there does
not appear to be a positive share price reaction
to announced firm layoffs. There appears to be
a small, but significantly negative, effect of
layoff announcements on stock price.
IV. Concluding Comments

As increasing numbers of white-collar
workers face insecurity in their jobs, high CEO
pay has become an even more controversial
topic. The perceived wisdom that CEO pay is
increasing while average worker pay has been
flat can be supported. From 1989 through 1995
the average CEO compensation in real terms
has increased between 37 and 76 percent in
this sample, depending on how it is measured,
while the average worker wage has declined
by 3 percent.20 Like most papers using a lot of

20

Average weekly wage o f production workers from

Economic Report o f the President ( 1997).
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CEO compensation data over a number of
years, this paper does not explore the issue of
the value of stock options granted. If options
are a way for boards to hide compensation
from shareholders and this is correlated with
layoffs, the results reported in Table 2 may be
biased. However, since the market reaction to
news of layoffs is generally negative, it seems
unlikely that the CEO’s options (or newly
granted options) would be more valuable if he
announced more layoffs. Also, “ other” com
pensation, which includes the value of savings
plan contributions and memberships to clubs,
yields results consistent with those reported
here. I also obtain very similar results using
the other two measures of pay as discussed
above.
In addition, a cursory examination of the
data suggests that CEOs who head firms with
layoff announcements in the previous year are
likely to have higher pay and larger percentage
raises than CEOs who head firms that are not
cutting jobs. However, I find that the kinds of
firms that make these layoff announcements
may also have several other characteristics in
common. One of these characteristics is firm
size. Firms that are relatively large are rela
tively more likely to announce layoffs and to
pay their CEOs more. In addition, the evidence
suggests that there are unobservable charac
teristics that are correlated with layoff status,
implying that a simple regression of compen
sation on only firm size and layoff status will
yield misleading results on layoff status. I find
that conditional on both observed and unob
served firm characteristics (via a fixed-effects
model), CEOs on average do not have higher
pay in years following announced layoffs.
This paper also finds that, on average, the
share price reaction to announced layoffs is
negative but very small. On the announcement
date of a layoff, the average firm loses only
0.4 percent of market value. Given that the av
erage CEO in the sample holds about 2 percent
of the stock in the firm for which he works and
the median value of the firms is $2.5 billion
over the period, this translates into a loss of
about $200,000 in the value of the sharehold
ings for the CEO in his own firm. While this
is not a trivial amount, it is only a small frac
tion of the average CEO’s holdings in the firm.
Also the direct effects of layoffs on pay are
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not large. Given that the average CEO had an
average yearly total compensation package of
$2.5 million over the sample period, it is dif
ficult to imagine that CEOs generally are in
fluenced by these short-term effects on their
own financial well-being when making layoff
decisions.
In short, the evidence does not support the
idea that CEOs receive financial gains in mak
ing layoff decisions. On average, if anything,
they appear to experience a small negative im
pact on their own financial well-being from a
layoff announcement. However, the magni
tudes of the average effects are so small that
it is difficult to imagine these “ self-interest”
effects have much, if any, influence on a given
CEO’s layoff decision.
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